Salem and Jerusalem

Salem and Jerusalem (Seek and Ye Shall Find)

            The sense of pursuing something at all costs is reflective of the will to life. In principle, we are beings who are limited by our form of Being. Even if we have attempted to divide the One and the many, placing the former either in a superior space which is yet life, though beyond itself, or by imagining that we are more deeply and fully part of that same Being, and thus this experience of life is but partial and transitory, we are still confronted by the challenge of living that life as a being incomplete. This is such a daunting prospect for the individual and for the community alike, that the intrusion of the One is historically seen as a regular feature of human existence. Now, whether or not this is truly an ‘intrusion’, irruptive and thus posing as irreal in space and time, or it is merely a construction, can only be judged from without. Modernity does not in general cleave to the conception of the One, for it has firmly parked this sensibility in non-human forms, trading the infinite for the indefinite. So, when we review specific historical events or even moods, we today gaze with both disdain and astonishment, that our ancestors could be so moved to have done what they did at the time in question.

            Our two metaphors, one of the witch-hunt and one of the crusade, closely related as they are but trending off in opposite directions – the former toward the person and thence the personal, the latter outward to the world and thence the cultural – will serve us both historically and analytically. Salem is synonymous with paranoia, local politics, Puritanism, misogyny but above all else, the abreaction against the abnormative. In Foucauldian mode, Salem is an exercise in small scale biopower. For pioneer settlers, faced as they were with an unending wilderness populated by superior numbers of indigenous peoples, unmarried childless women were an unaffordable luxury. Whatever the hysteria of charges against these women might have been in the minds of both their peers and their leaders, the basic transgression was of the most basic reproductive rule, made extreme by the circumstances. Salem is with us today in the anti-abortion movement, mainly helmed by women, and in the anti-gay movement. Anyone who opts out of the reproductive cycle cannot entirely be trusted not to do the same with that of production-consumption. Indeed, one might well suggest that child-free couples and gay persons are only tolerated because their lack of childcare duties allows them to be more productive in their workplaces, and this in turn affords them more economic power in the marketplace. If we take this tack, it is merely a question of balancing role-players: how many ‘breeders’ does one need and how many hyper-consumers, how many workaholics and how many stay-at-home caretakers? In this mode of analysis, biopower is diffused along the lines of social role expectation.

            But Salem is also an outlook. It casts a profound aspersion upon those who seek to live their lack of oneness outside of the basic social norms. Just so, if the One is lost to that same contemporary life, it can only be approximated in a society that heeds fairly strictly the norms of its organicity. Society can only be made into community in this manner. The former is too abstract a oneness; I cannot experience it directly. But the latter gives me something I can actually feel in my day-to-day rounds. I am part of something larger than myself; a community not of like minds but of like actions and inactions, and through these I express my own willing charity and even good-naturedness interacting with these small scale others. This is the ‘othership’, which partakes only in the Cartesian sense of ‘here is another like myself; they are not me but I could be them’. Here, I am one of them and hence approximate the One with them, but only with them. But to those who depart from this most basic form of otherness, while at the same time potentially adding to the difficulty of both social reproduction and economic growth, I am disagreeable. In salemic times, I am hard-pressed to extend my best self and my otherwise good-naturedness in all directions at once.

            This is also key: that there are now a multitude of different callers upon my good will, not just those with alternative sexualities or reproductive sensibilities, but those hailing from a myriad of diverse cultures, who are at once rivals and allies. Globalism is not the same as cosmopolitanism. Acceptance does not equal tolerance, and neither take the place of understanding. Salem itself was so small a group that there could be no deviation, even numerically, between what society was and what was community. Here, acceptance, tolerance and understanding must be the same thing, for the Puritans found themselves living in an organic culture set down into mechanical conditions. In Durkheimian mode, the colonies were a contradiction in organizational terms. When one’s culture and one’s conditions are askew, internal scrutiny becomes the most intense. Everyone must do their part. Beyond this, the original charges against the sectarians, the very reason they fled Europe, included dealings in the occult; they were themselves, by doctrinaire old-world standards, devil-worshippers. To then have even a hint of such within their own exiled and pariah communities would have been too much to bear. At the same time, marriages of convenience always break asunder after the most critical moment has passed. Those brought together by mutual loss and mourning struggle to find their way as a new unit once the much-vaunted ‘new life’ is attained. Wartime allies, such as the Western powers and the Soviet Union in 1945, retreat into their respective geopolitical corners. And communities who have been forced out of one place undergo internecine purges once a safe refuge is discovered. Salem was this purge, this divorce, this political realignment. It was largely symbolic in that it scapegoated a few; anything more widespread would have wiped out the entire affair.

            Salem as metaphor is about internal purity, but Jerusalem is about purifying the wider world based upon the already attained purity of the internal Oneness. Jerusalem, as the goal of an externalizing crusade, represents a regaining and thence grounding, just as Salem might be seen as a finding and thence a re-grounding in a mimesis of the autochthonous. Salem is the cosmogony reiterated, Jerusalem the cosmology created, but they are two side of the same historical coin. It is not simply about xenophobia let alone ideology. The fear of otherness is a fear that the self is not able to maintain itself. My homophobia speaks to my own sexual doubts. I may not even be attracted to other men but I will always find some women unattractive. My ethnocentrism expresses a similar skepticism: there are many things within my own culture of birth that I abhor. One sure-fire way of overcoming these doubts is to project them onto others; not so differently do I ‘transfer’ my neurotic symptoms onto significant others, endangering the intimacy of the othership which I hold so dear. A culture that cannot afford to fight amongst itself is best prepared to wage war on another. The historic crusades were an example of this ‘coming together in the face of a common enemy without’. Unlike the Columbian Conquest, which was a competition amongst developing nations who needed the leverage new markets and new resources would bring them, the Crusades engendered a singular goal: the retrieval of the origin of life itself.

            If Salem had recreated life, that of the culture and that of the faith, Jerusalem remained the font of both. Only one crusade was actually militarily successful, but this is immaterial to the force of the symbolic content present in the idea of Oneness and how to merge once again with it. In our outsized cosmology, to witness the birth of the current installment of the universe is seemingly a benign crusade. The otherness in the way is itself a mere happenstance; it could have been any different culture, or even a very similar one – indeed, in fact it was, given religion, lifeway, subsistence pattern and economy, gender relations and many more characteristics –  which presently occupies the promised landscape; it is simply the idea that I am not within that space, that of creation, that of all the force which opposes death. If Salem means to confront the mortality of the community emanating from within its own bounds, its own force occurs outside of the space of origins. The farther one travelled away from this center, the more at risk one was to encounter the dissenter, for who out here could have heard of the center of life, dwelling at such a distance from it? Salem is also thus a genuflective expression of Jerusalem, an orison directed back toward the center from the uttermost margins, which the new American colonies would certainly have qualified as. Yet Europe, by the High Medieval period, could well have seen itself as a margin, flung out in a patchwork of Christian diasporas, only tenuously tethered to the Levant, facing out upon, at that time, an unknown ocean of counter-being. It is not a coincidence that Europe turned back before turning forward, into its own imagined womb before out into the unimaginable world.

            It is transparently clear that both Salem and Jerusalem are with us yet. In all internal examinations, from the petty McCarthyisms of a political purge to the more profound disinfectants of normative salute, the martinette strutting in the first stage, but the marionette the very goal of the second, the salemic jingo speaks its spiel. If in times of relative lack of success in enforcing the oneness upon its own society, then at the cultural level, there will be a call to exogamous arms. The sense that there lies in wait a common enemy, ready to destroy us if we do not ‘come together as one’, surely exerts a powerful suasion. But this aspect of the dual metaphors is old hat. If we are to more fully comprehend the oft-oscillating historical dynamic involving Salem and Jerusalem we would do better to consider their relationship to the will to life as a whole. For one could live on in an altered culture; humanity is in fact not that diverse. No, the truer sticking point is not cultural difference, but that I myself am not the one who can know oneness, who can relive the creation, who is divorced from Being. That some other culture attained the purity of the central mimesis, regained the exacting proximity to the authentic center, the Mecca, the Mt. Fuji, the Ararat, the Mount Meru and so on. To be apart from that ultimate and death-defying success is to be committed to a truncated life. To be only adopted, or yet co-opted, into the other’s existential apex is to lose my ontological status as a being of Being. This is the deeper reason why some refer to those who flout the norms as being ‘existential threats’, whether directed at those of the interior or of the exterior.

            Without the center I am absented from the One. I can no longer experience the uniquely plural personhood of beings because I do not have any sure basis of comparison; Being is absent. This modern condition would be tolerable if no other human being yet sought Being through either a Salem or a Jerusalem, but alas we have as a species not matured to the point wherein the center can be redefined as within each human life; where the Being of beings resides only in that same existential arc that defines our collective finitude.

            G.V. Loewen is the author of over 60 books, and was professor of the interdisciplinary human sciences for over two decades.

Is Wholly Rational Action Realizable?

Is Wholly Rational Action Realizable?

This to you, who lives beyond my reach and ken

                        Yet I love thee as I would the one who strains for me alone

                        I cannot breast such love as my heart now and then

                        Breaks itself upon the shore that also crushes bone

                        No wonder you exult the air above, the night that is beyond men

                        And women both, and all those in between that set in stone

                        No longer will love be known as ever that

                        Extant between the fair and fairer seen

                        And I am but the herald of this wider, longer matte

                        Laying underneath all two-souled color been

                        These souls have given up their claim, their pat

                        Clamor against which I have plugged by ears atween

                        Enter thus! I both command and commend to thee

                        So that we may port your soul and souled asunder

                        Split as is the heavens by the lighted scree

                        Split as were my eyes and ears and lips by thunder

                        Such storms as these will ever question me

                        So I shall ne’er accept the loot of blunder

                        Enter thus, I beg you in loving supplication

                        With my tears, my sweat, my mucus, juice and blood alike

                        Even my offal, but not awful urination

                        Meant no disrespect but only that with I would strike

                        Down all who overlook our human situation

                        And to this I call you to return to us your endless Reich.

            In the quotidian of my life, I long for transcendence. Such are the days that have been that the days that will be are resented. But what of the days that might be? What of the moments that seem to uplift our consciousness into another kind of day altogether? What are their source? Can we conjure the magical from the mundane, the sacred from the profane, the very order of nature from the historic disorder of culture?

            In the verse, the speaker ‘begs’, calls attention to her ‘loving supplication’ which is surpliced over with all manner of bodily disjecta membra, not in the service of a guttural paean but rather to state that every aspect of her being is involved in the orison. But at first we are called to attend the place of the one who is called and is to be called. She herself is so distant, so removed from the day to day that her very reality is doubted. She is ‘beyond’ both my reach, my experience, and as such it is also implied that such a beyond is separated from the doings of both men and women alike. This object of desire must be a creature of the night air, a being who is thus never at risk of shipwreck, as the speaker tells of herself. And how then to bridge that chasm? Give birth to a higher form of love, a love hitherto unknown and even unknowable. This novel love will no longer hold ‘between the fair and fairer’, and within its embrace those whose souls were separate give over their patent claim to be mere individuals. No, here they are to be only one thing, and yet this is not yet real, which is why the speaker casts herself as merely a ‘herald’ and one who has had to ‘plug her ears’ against the divisive character of previous human relations. The speaker vows to not be either distracted by a base show of emotions, ‘split as were my eyes and ears and lips’, nor by even nature’s display of forces which seem as well to lie beyond the mundane sphere. She also cannot be bought by illusion, the ‘loot of blunder’. Finally, she returns to her own humanity and realizes that this higher love is in fact part of our shared birthright that in turn cannot be ‘overlooked’ and to which she commands the return of that eternal birthright and its ‘endless Reich’.

            Weber reminds us that any interpretation of human action in the world must call itself to attend to the fact that in each action there is a representation of something (‘The Nature of Social Action, 1922). And thus in each, there is also a herald, if you will, of the judgment of others upon not only how well I have represented this or that normative or superlative value but whether or not the value is itself worthy of my representation rather than one better, one lesser, or yet none at all. In calling across the ages to the thing that is most desired, be it a deity, a beloved friend, a kindred spirit long deceased, a work of art, we must first be more or less certain that how we value this ‘object’ is how we might imagine it valuing itself. What is the self-valuation of the object of desire? How does it, in other words, desire itself to be desired?

            The most common example of the disjunction of such a calling occurs when we fall in love with one who cannot love us in return, or will not. Though this seems an extremity of social action or perhaps better, a moment of social inaction or even non-action, it is nevertheless not an extramundane experience in any sense. Its very lack sabotages any sense that it could become ‘something’ more than a distant desire, or at best, the ‘one that got away’. What Weber refers to as a ‘binding normative force’ in this instance and like others acts to prevent action, places a limit upon our desires – they must be shared and specifically must be shared by the object in question – and brings into play a quasi-discursive challenge to the day to day sociality of human relations. This challenge is issued from ethics.

            The more amorphous the object – the divine, the natural, the cosmic, the aesthetic – the easier it is to overlook the ethical angle. Less vague are the dead. They were persons as we now are and yet are, but they are now not subject to personal desires. We might yet imagine they can respond to us through their works, of course. We are not, after all, impinging upon another person who is currently like ourselves or ever will be so again in the future. If we do so impinge upon him, he is more than likely long dead, far beyond our desire in any manner that would suggest an unethical stance. We might even ‘speak ill’ of him, in his unresponsive ‘state’ of being, and still do him no harm at all. This is one reason why a motion toward the transcendent is characterized by non-rational inclinations. In our impersonal ardor, we are ourselves removed from any responsibility towards a known ‘other’ who also lives and thus has her own life to live.

            Calling upon the non-human, the past, nature, deity or cosmos as itself a bastion of Being which is non-being, remits any obligation on our parts to take care of the other, to be concerned for her status or her being in the world-as-it-is. This apparently non-ethical distanciation is convenient for anyone who seeks to convince living others that his intentions are pure, noble, and untainted by personal or even personalist agenda. ‘God is on our side’ feels inclusive and even oddly warm. It is non-threatening, at least at first, because someone has issued forth a demand that entails both myself and a transcendental being, of whom I know next to nothing, and can know at best that its non-human character is also not subject to human desires. This too is reassuring, for then I might well imagine that judgment could only emanate from a human or at worst, an historical source. ‘Religion is society worshipping itself’, yes, I may quote to myself, but what of belief? What of spirit? What of that ‘two-souled colour’ that has been the case prior to the novel call for an unheard of union of souls?

            What the call to Being limits is our concernfulness for the living other. In its halcyon heraldry, transcendentally oriented orison cleaves the existential fabric that weaves beings together, in favor of contriving an ontological uplink that connects Being and beings in a manner that does vital disservice to both. Yet even in a ‘secularistic’ age, we have need of Being, and not only on our own terms. Being yet has a service to perform, and one about which there are several aspects; 1. It provides the model for rationality bereft of history; it is the ideal type upon which historical types are in counterpoint. 2. It is also a ‘role model’ for persons who are beings but who also occupy social roles which often conflict or are at best regularly strained in the face of one another; Being is unburdened of all roles and yet appears to possess a singular role, it is a form of imagination that owns its vocation rather than being owned by its labour. 3. It is a goal to which beings strive forward; it represents thus an ‘absolute value’ towards which rational action may be generally directed, and 4. Being retains its value as a manner in which to access, cross-culturally and across time, all of the human works, the works of beings, which have attempted to emulate it.

            So far we have enumerated the facets of the ultimate object of human desire and also have seen how this ‘customary’ dynamic informs both a commonplace call to another to perform a function for us as well as the uncommon calling to the Other. This one has found herself distant and distanciated not merely from myself but from the world and thus must be called to return. She returns though in altered form and one in which is likened to a selfsame other who in turn cannot exist without my presence; ‘yet I love thee as the one who strains for me alone’. The much vaunted ‘death of God’ as a mere prelude as well as a foreshadowing of the end of mankind is a rootsy manner of expressing the problem of the loss of Being in beings-as-they-are. For a phenomenology, this existentiality insists upon only existing and not therefore being at all. Not that our historical beings must instead possess a profound essentiality about them, as if only those of our own kind and time have realized their spiritual potential, their ethical apogee, or their aesthetic will. It is neither a question of placing existence ‘before’ essence as if the Cartesian ghost in the Mandevillian machine had been awakened by the gnawing patter of the mechanisms at hand. For historical beings, existence is in fact our essential state. Dasein only ‘completes itself’ in its ownmost death.

            I would thus suggest that any call to consciousness as either the modern gloss of deity or the post-modern guise of nature is premature. It not only presumes that what we know or what we can know of our own history is complete enough to have a stable and stamina-laden understanding of said consciousness, it also assumes that whatever is left over that we do not know or have yet to fully understand, including that of the collected works of many of our own recent thinkers, is all that is left to consciousness and therefore we have at least sketched its limits. I think we are mistaken on both points. Being as constructed from the history of consciousness alone forsakes the daily desires of myself and others which are never uplifted into either rational discourse or the ‘arational’ archive of human achievement. For we are mostly and daily kindred with the unknown soldiers of histories unwritten. We are beings without Being and yet we must be counted, and counted upon, in order for a history of consciousness to have taken shape and thence continually to redefine itself.

            Therefore within this limited context wholly rational action too is not only implausible, it may well be impossible. One, if Being has represented to itself an ideal rationality, then history has seen all such transient representation come and go. Belief in the abstract is not enough for a deity to exist upon. Two, Divinity is itself, as a characteristic of transcendental Being, a Parousia of Being-not, for it cannot claim to be the ideal if it itself sets upon any singular circumstance that history affords it, from the human perspective. Only its radical alien quality may make such a claim; one without history and without a history. And how much value could such a Being have? Similarly, and three, we as beings cannot be beholden to the singular, either in our transient selfhood to which accrues not only differing social roles but also serial and ongoing phases of life which too are quite different from one another. In this sense, Being is but the idealization of a human life once lived and, in the completion of Dasein’s existence alongside that life, an idealized hindsight that connects us once again with the ‘sidereal circle in which the gathering of souls commences’.

            G.V. Loewen is the author of over fifty books in ethics, aesthetics, religion, health and social theory, as well as fiction. He was professor of the interdisciplinary human sciences for over two decades.