Normalism: Our New Testament (the sacred search for belonging)
The concentration upon form over content lends itself to an expression of self-distanciation. Formalism in the discourses speaks first about the language of symbolic forms, which takes precedence over, or ahead of, possible truth claims made by these disciplines. In mathematics there is, for example, no sense that the language of math represents truths of nature; only the symbols are ‘real’. Formalism in the arts has a varied career, but the sense that the mechanics of how art is done is more important than its specific content or even historical context is highlighted. ‘Normalism’ is thus the preference to see oneself as a type of person rather than a uniquely individuated personhood. It is a self bereft of selfhood, and ultimately, Das Man rather than Dasein. And yet the quest for alternate communities, with their own norms being constructed after the fact of both the search and the distanciatedness it must bring to the incomplete selfhood, does not escape either the anxiety or the aspiration associated with all human needs regarding belonging, or feeling that one is part of something greater than oneself. Let’s explore how this latest set of attempts at founding a ‘new normal’ has fared in both the light of those previous, and the more perennial sense that humanity proper is never not without sociality.
Commonly inherited boundaries that have demarcated group affiliations include social class background, sex at birth, ‘race’, and geographic region as well as religious tradition or credo. To these one enjoined level of education, profession, and a variety of voluntaristic or benevolent associations, charities, foundations, or political parties. The European triumvirate of ‘class, status, party’, to which Weber and others gave so much analytic attention, has of course now fallen away, beginning so quite precipitously in the post-war period. In our own time, sex has given way to gender, class to labor group or even industry sector, and party to a myriad of political ‘identities’ which agree only in that the personal expression of self as a category should also define that person’s political suasion. There are five or six biologically defined sexes for human beings, but the number of potential genders is indefinite. There are a scant few classes in capital, but career possibilities are numerous, if still shuttered by one’s birth status and access to the resources of personal augmentation, such as level of education and indeed, source of accreditation. This last has become, if possible, even more desperately associated with social class; all we must do is recall the recent spate of college entrance scandals. It is anathema to be a child of either wealth or celebrity and yet have to acknowledge that one is a dimwit, as evaluated by the steep hierarchy of university rankings.
Yet the ‘outs’ for children of meager intellectual or other personal means have always been afoot. Prior to the second war, the military was itself considered to be a solid career for the child whose ambitions or abilities were mediocre. Immigration was also a reasonable path. Second sons, disinherited through traditional European property laws, could ‘seek their fortune’ in the new nation-builds of the empires at large. Immigration could be combined with military service, or better, that diplomatic, which required at least a modicum of wit as well as tact. Going into imperial state service siphoned off a great deal of ‘extra’ children, as well as those deemed unfit to inherit the family business, be it the new money of industry or the old wealth of property. Woe to the family who could not place any of their children to an advantageous position. My hometown saw an extended case of such a desperate domesticity in the Dunsmuirs. Once the most powerful magnate on Vancouver Island, none of John Dunsmuir’s nine children was apparently adept at anything much – it is plausible the ninth of these was sired by a mistress, given this youngest daughter’s strikingly good looks, in absolute contrast to those of the previous six, attesting to the efforts involved in finding a worthy successor, but no matter – and thus in a scant two generations, by 1967, the entire family had died out.
The limits traditionally placed on sexuality have blown up, rather in our collective faces, starting perhaps around 1963, with the general introduction of simply taken birth control. We are told, with a rather pedantically pedagogic stance, that there have ‘always been queer and gay people, its just that…’ and so on. Indeed, this may well be the case, but what there has never been is a society or yet a culture that recognized ‘them’ as distinctly gendered categories somehow equivalent to those dominant in the male and the female.. Verdi provides an exemplar of how the going rate of a reproductively oriented society was able to digest alternate sexualities without promoting alternate gender categories, as a number of his operas center around major historical figures known to be gay or queer, and who had to avoid exposing themselves too publicly for fear of losing their status and their power. Today, we might be ‘suspicious’ that old Joe Green was also one of them, but again, no matter, since he celebrated these lives in the context of high art, never making the error, both categorical and ethical, that their nobility in any way stemmed from their sexuality etc.. This is the fundamental problem with contemporary identity politics: that it proclaims one’s human value to be ordered by one’s life-chance variables, the list of which having been adumbrated in questionably relevant ways.
Now, it may be said that discursively, since the Enlightenment concept of the sovereign self has become somewhat jaded, and just so, mostly with itself, that the humane thing to do is to open the door to other versions of selfhood in its stead. The law, for instance, has not yet followed along with this politics, but could be said to be observing from alongside. This ‘sovereignty’ was meant as an intellectual and a political statement: that I as an individual am not beholden to either the state or the church. This was the eighteenth century’s great political and intellectual cause. It was of course Marx who, while acknowledging the moribund character of the church and the abettor lack of character, shall we put it, of the state, nevertheless cautioned mightily against this sovereignty by reminding everyone that ‘yes, but you are beholden to your class’. To this Nietzsche added ‘and to your culture’ or lack thereof, and lastly Freud as well, soon thereafter, ‘yes, and to your unconscious’. With some dismay, I would imagine, the post-Enlightenment self had rapidly become too enlightened with itself! This was perhaps not quite what Delphi had imagined implying. Knowing thyself in modernity requires of us a somewhat more sophisticated analytic, and it is this truth which, though epistemic to be sure, has also been interpreted as being personal.
For the Greeks, knowing thy rank, a kind of status in society but also with regard to the fates as well as in relation to the gods and their druthers, is what is meant by the ‘self’. During the transition from mythos to logos, selfhood remained an amalgam of archetype and what was imagined to be base essence, such as manhood or womanhood, adulthood or childhood, slave or citizen and so on. This was uplinked into a more ethereal tradition of mythic tropes, so that the Greek could refer to the one who went against social norms and customs – the one who was ‘abnormative’ in our language today – simply as a ‘moron’. But the one who went against the fates was a hypermoron, no less! We have, needless to say, forgotten only this second, more superlative term, simply because we no longer believe in either fates or furies. And yet, willy-nilly, the two have returned in the form of ‘feelings’ or even moods, to haunt both the annoyed ethicist as well as all those charged with defending ‘morality’. We are also told, of late, that to be queer or gay or what-have-you is akin to a form of fatedness; for it defines not only one’s personhood but also colors every interaction these so-fated persons have with the rest of us as well as with our once-shared institutional cultures. As falls fate, so falls fury, since both our reaction to the novel presence – supposedly in numbers, according to the pseudo-revolutionaries, and supposedly in threatening numbers according to the neo-traditionalists; both claims are, to my mind, utterly unconvincing if not outright vapid – and then their reaction to our reaction regularly ramps up into the furious.
Such is contemporary life, and indeed, life with our phenomenological contemporaries, that we are forced to reckon with this ongoing reckoning, hence the copious amounts of popular analyses which pervade mainstream media as well as bastions of neo-conservatism. These latter-day evangels have made the defense of what has of late been called, rather disdainfully by those fashionably enlightened, ‘binarism’, into their own cause célebre, which is as disenchanting as the supposed source of this call to respectable arms. In contrast to any of this, one must ask oneself, ‘have I ever needed to include what is vulgar about my humanity and my character in the cast of internal heroes upon whom I call to make myself more noble?’. If we dare not answer in the negative, what we are claiming is that sexuality is the equal of the call to conscience, that gender politics is the equal of one’s being-aheadedness, that anxiousness is the same as Anxiety, and that one’s personal desires are no different than one’s personal character. As Hillerman’s Higgins would say to Selleck, ‘Oh my God, Magnum!’.
The next step would be to investigate, scientifically and analytically, the root historical and cultural causes of this shift in self-perception. It is not enough to be disaffected with the ‘sovereign self’ and thence call off the whole project of modernity simply because it has not yet fulfilled its universal promise. A premise is just that, and only by the singularly impoverished logic of identity politics does the premise somehow equal the promise. Indeed, given what it took to get to the premise alone, we as a species owe everything we are and have to pushing this sensibility toward its existential futurity. Do we cast aside the three millennia of overcoming superstition, ethnocentrism, and misanthropy in order merely to reproduce some personalist version of all three of them? Today we are urged to celebrate nothing more than the human bereft of humanity, and beings with no conception of Being. In turn, supposedly avoiding this fetid fate, we are then urged to destroy it in the name of antique humanity; the persona bereft of personhood, the ‘thyself’ as a what and never a who. There is an alternative: the historical and existential being in the world; my ownmost selfhood which is completed in a fitting act of fate and faith alike.
G.V. Loewen is the author of over 60 books, and was professor of the interdisciplinary human sciences for over two decades.